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National Security Whistleblowing vs.
Dodd-Frank Whistleblowing
FINDING A BALANCE AND A MECHANISM TO
ENCOURAGE NATIONAL SECURITY
WHISTLEBLOWERS
INTRODUCTION
On June 14, 2013, five days after Edward Snowden
revealed himself as the person who leaked classified documents
to Glenn Greenwald, the United States filed a criminal
complaint in the Eastern District of Virginia, charging
Snowden with “theft, ‘unauthorized communication of national
defense information,’ and ‘willful communication of classified
communications intelligence information to an unauthorized
person.’”1 The recent release of scores of information regarding
the surveillance programs of the National Security Agency
(NSA) was first reported by Greenwald, a reporter at the
British national newspaper, The Guardian.2 Charging Snowden
is reflective of an aggressive policy of the U.S. government to
discourage whistleblowing about national security issues.
Snowden began his whistleblowing in January 2013, when he
reached out to a documentary filmmaker to discuss the extent
of the NSA’s surveillance program.3 In February 2013,
Snowden contacted Greenwald to reveal what he knew.4
Snowden then began sending secured documents that he had
obtained through his work with Booz Allen Hamilton, a defense
1 Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. Charges Snowden with Espionage, WASH.
POST (June 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-charges-
snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_story.html.
2 Glenn Greenwald & EwenMacAskill,NSA Prism Program Taps In To User Data
of Apple, Google and Others, GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
3 Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden: How the Spy Story of the Age Leaked
Out: The Full Story Behind the Scoop and Why the Whistleblower Approached the
Guardian, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
jun/11/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-profile.
4 Id.
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contractor that was working for the NSA.5 Some of the
documents included information about the “Prism” program,
which collects “information from the world’s leading technology
companies”6 about Internet communications, and a U.S. court
order compelling Verizon to turn over phone records of
American citizens.7 Public reaction has been divided, with some
touting Snowden as a hero and others calling him a traitor.8
The government responded by filing the aforementioned
charges against him for violations of the 1917 Espionage Act,
as well as theft.9 Currently, Snowden has been granted asylum
for one year in Russia and has supposedly started a job helping
to maintain a website there.10
The Obama Administration has brought charges for
violations of the 1917 Espionage Act against national security
whistleblowers with some frequency.11 At least one of those
5 Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The Whistleblower Behind the NSA
Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveillance?guni=Network%20
front:network-front%20aux-1%20mini-bento:Bento%20box%208%20col:Position1:sublinks.
6 Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden: How the Spy Story of the Age Leaked
Out: The Full Story Behind the Scoop and Why the Whistleblower Approached the
Guardian, GUARDIAN (June 12, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/
11/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-profile.
7 Id.
8 See Ariel Edwards-Levy & Sunny Freeman, Americans Still Can’t Decide
Whether Edward Snowden is a ‘Traitor’ or ‘A Hero,’ Poll Finds, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct.
30, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/30/edward-snowden-
poll_n_4175089.html (reporting a poll that found 51% of Americans thought Snowden
was “something of a hero” while 49% thought Snowden was “more of a traitor”); Robert
Kuttner, Time to Thank Edward Snowden, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 10, 2013, 9:57 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/robert-kuttner/time-to-thank-snowden_b_4252208.html
(arguing, as the title suggests, that we should and someday may be grateful for
Snowden’s leaks despite their illegality because they sparked the conversation regarding
the extent of America’s surveillance programs). Interestingly, Daniel Ellsberg, the
whistleblower who released the Pentagon Papers, has joined the national dialogue
regarding whether Snowden is a traitor or a hero. See infra Part I.A. In addition to
praising Snowden for making these disclosures in a Washington Post editorial, most
recently, Ellsberg took to the popular social news website Reddit.com to answer any
questions users wanted to ask him. The title of the post and the beginning of the “thread”
reads “I am Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg. Edward Snowden is my Hero. [Ask
me Anything].” See Daniel Ellsberg, Daniel Ellsberg: NSA Leaker Snowden Made the
Right Call, WASH. POST (July 7, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/daniel-
ellsberg-nsa-leaker-snowden-made-the-right-call/2013/07/07/0b46d96c-e5b7-11e2-aef3-
339619eab080_story.html; Daniel Ellsberg, I am Pentagon Papers Leaker Daniel Ellsberg.
Edward Snowden is My Hero. AMA, REDDIT (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.reddit.com/
r/IAmA/comments/1vahsi/i_am_pentagon_papers_leaker_daniel_ellsberg/.
9 Peter Finn & Sari Horwitz, U.S. Charges Snowden with Espionage, WASH.
POST (June 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-charges-
snowden-with-espionage/2013/06/21/507497d8-dab1-11e2-a016-92547bf094cc_story.html.
10 Alla Eshchenko, Edward Snowden Gets Website Job in Russia, Lawyer Says,
CNN (Oct. 31, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/31/world/europe/russia-snowden-job/.
11 Richard Moberly, Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National
Security Dilemma, 16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 51, 75-76 (2012).
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cases involved prosecuting a whistleblower who disclosed
information regarding wasted funds at the NSA—information
which the Inspector General Report substantiated.12
Notwithstanding the substantiated claims of the whistleblower,
after a five year investigation, the whistleblower “pled guilty to a
misdemeanor charge of ‘exceeding authorized use of a
computer.’”13 More recently, Private First Class Chelsea Manning
(born Bradley Manning) was sentenced to 35 years in prison for
charges under the Espionage Act for being the source of the
WikiLeaks documents.14 In total, President Obama has charged
eight individuals with violations of the Espionage Act for leaking
classified information, which is more than all other presidents
combined.15 It is for this reason that “[h]aving watched the Obama
Administration prosecute whistleblowers at a historically
unprecedented rate, [Snowden] fully expects the US government
to attempt to use all its weight to punish him.”16
Now consider the recent Dodd-Frank legislation and the
reward program for corporate whistleblowers who report
corporate fraud and abuse to the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). On July 21, 2010, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank)
became law.17 The Act was passed and signed into law by
President Obama in “response to the 2008 financial crisis that
tipped the nation into the worst recession since the Great
Depression.”18 One goal of Dodd-Frank is “to encourage
whistleblower participation in the promotion of corporate
governance.”19 To date, the SEC has issued three whistleblower
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Luis Martinez & Steven Portnoy, Bradley Manning Guilty on Most
Charges, But Not Aiding Enemy, ABC NEWS (July 30, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/
Blotter/bradley-manning-guilty-charges-aiding-enemy/story?id=19797378. Julie Tate,
Bradley Manning Sentenced to 35 Years in WikiLeaks Case, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/judge-to-sentence-bradley-
manning-today/2013/08/20/85bee184-09d0-11e3-b87c-476db8ac34cd_story.html.
15 Daniel Politi, Obama Has Charged More Under Espionage Act Than All
Other Presidents Combined, SLATE (June 22, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_
slatest/2013/06/22/edward_snowden_is_eighth_person_obama_has_pursued_under_
espionage_act.html.
16 Greenwald et al., supra note 5.
17 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
18 Helene Cooper, Obama Signs Overhaul of Financial System, N.Y. TIMES
(July 21, 2010), www.nytimes.com/2010/07/22/business/22regulate.html?_r=0.
19 Umang Desai, Comment, Crying Foul: Whistleblower Provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 427, 429 (2010).
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awards.20 The first award occurred within a year of Dodd-Frank
becoming law and was in the amount of $50,000 (or 30% of the
judgment), while the second award, 15% of the $7.5 million
judgment, occurred recently in June 2013.21 The most recent
award was in the amount of $14 million for information that
resulted in an SEC enforcement action to recover investor
funds.22 Although only three awards have been given out, the
SEC received 3001 tips in the Fiscal Year 2012, which is an
average of about eight tips per day.23 These statistics suggest
that the whistleblower provisions of Dodd-Frank are at least
minimally effective. But, regardless of the provision’s effects,
the message is clear: the U.S. government encourages
whistleblowing within public companies.24
This note will examine the Dodd-Frank Act and related
whistleblowing provisions that apply to the corporate world
and the whistleblowing provisions in place within the
government, especially as they pertain to the release of
information related to national security. Upon examination, it will
be clear that there is an inconsistency between the objectives of
the different whistleblower provisions. It will also become evident
that a different standard exists for public companies pursuant to
Dodd-Frank that does not apply to the government itself. Under
Dodd-Frank, the U.S. government policy objective is obvious: the
federal government wants whistleblowers to report corporate
wrongdoing that may result in financial losses to the SEC. Yet,
when it comes to enabling government employees and
contractors to blow the whistle on government perpetrated
fraud or abuse, including possible violations of constitutional
rights, the existing patchwork of federal legislation does little
to provide a meaningful way for individuals to raise appropriate
concerns without fear of retaliation or prosecution. This lack of a
functional system within the government has arguably
contributed to the leaking of confidential documents by Edward
20 Press Release, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Awards
More than $14 Million to Whistleblower (Oct. 1, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/
News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370539854258#.UtlejHn0Bdg; see also Erika
Kelton, SEC Whistleblower Rewards: Larger Ones Are Coming, FORBES (June 26, 2013,
5:18 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2013/06/26/sec-officials-on-whistleblower-
rewards-the-best-is-yet-to-come/.
21 Kelton, supra note 20.
22 Press Release, supra note 20.
23 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT ON THE DODD-FRANK
WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 4-5, 11 (2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/owb/annual-report-2012.pdf.
24 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 748, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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Snowden. The Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions, a more
functional whistleblower system, have arguably prevented or
addressed frauds reported as well as contributed to the
development of more effective internal reporting mechanisms
within companies.25
Drawing on the lessons from these inconsistencies, this
note argues that the federal government should adopt a
whistleblower scheme that is based on both the whistleblower
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act and the basic premise of
checks and balances. Through Congress’s power to create
courts pursuant to Articles I and III of the Constitution,26 a
separate court should be created roughly based on the United
States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to respond to
whistleblowers within the intelligence community. The new
whistleblower court is certainly a starting point in an effort to
balance both the interests of the United States citizen and the
interests of an effective United States government and to
provide an adequate solution to the age-old question of “who
watches the watchers?”
Part I will discuss the relevant national security
whistleblower laws as well as the relevant provisions of the
Dodd-Frank Act. Part II will highlight the differences between
the laws in both their structure and application. Finally, Part
III will propose a new whistleblower court that is based on the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to address the
shortcomings of the national security whistleblower provisions.
This new whistleblower court will adequately deal with the
issues unique to national security, namely the need for secrecy,
while still protecting individuals’ rights.
I. THEWHISTLEBLOWER PROVISIONS
Whistleblowers in the national security industry of the
United States government face a more complex, unclear, and
inhospitable landscape than their counterparts in the corporate
world. There is an inherent tension between national security
and whistleblower laws because of the secrecy demanded by
national security.27 The tension has been described as the need
for a “private space” where the President and his advisors can
make the best decisions without the pressures of public
25 See infra Part I.C.
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
27 ROBERT G. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER
LAWS 212 (2012).
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scrutiny.28 Despite this, “the Constitution promotes government
transparency and Congressional oversight of the executive
branch.”29 The following discussion will summarize the
whistleblower protections relevant to national security and the
Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions.
A. National Security Whistleblower Provisions
One commentator described generally whistleblower
protections in national security:
The laws affecting national security whistleblowers differ dramatically
from general [whistleblower] provisions . . . . [E]mployees may report
misconduct related to national security to a more limited group of
people, excluding most of Congress and all of the public. Moreover,
less protection from retaliation exists, and the judicial branch has no
oversight of retaliation claims because the claims are adjudicated
administratively within the executive branch and often within the
whistleblower’s own agency, if at all.30
The origins of whistleblower protection law reform can be
traced to the Watergate scandal.31 Daniel Ellsberg played a major
role in the Watergate scandal and, as a result, has been described
as “one of the best-known whistleblowers in US history.”32 Daniel
Ellsberg released what became known as the Pentagon Papers to
two newspapers.33 As a Rand Corporation employee, he contributed
to a study conducted by Robert McNamara concerning United
States involvement in Vietnam; the result was the highly critical
Pentagon Papers.34 Ellsberg released the Pentagon Papers first to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1969 and then to the
New York Times and the Washington Post in 1970.35 After
releasing the study to the newspapers, the federal government
prosecuted him “for illegal possession of classified documents
and a failure to return them to proper custody,” but the case
was dismissed because, among other illegal activities, the
executive branch was illegally spying on Ellsberg and his
attorney, and executive branch employees broke into Ellsberg’s
28 Moberly, supra note 11, at 91.
29 Id.
30 Id. at 95-96.
31 VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 72 (noting that “[w]ithout Watergate it is unlikely
that Congress would have enacted the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA), and
without that Act the whistleblower provision might have been delayed for years”).
32 Id. at 73, 215-17.
33 Id. at 73.
34 Id.
35 Id.
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psychologist’s office.36 President Nixon justified the illegal
activity in the name of national security.37 In response to the
Watergate Scandal, Congress passed the Civil Service Reform Act
of 1978 (CSRA)38 and the Inspector General Act of 1978.39 Both of
these acts are considered “Watergate-reform legislation.”40
The Inspector General Act of 1978 is a statutory scheme
that offers protection to federal employee whistleblowers. The
Inspector General Act “authorizes the inspectors general to
receive and investigate complaints or information received
from agency employees concerning a violation of law, rules, or
regulations; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; abuse of
authority; or a substantial and specific danger to the public
health and safety.”41 Unlike the other statutes discussed below,
there is no exemption from protection for federal employees in
the intelligence community.42 For example, whistleblowers from
the NSA and DIA (two intelligence community agencies under
the Department of Defense)43 are protected.
The law provides that the inspector general’s office of
the Department of Defense investigate complaints concerning
fraud or abuse or other information revealed to them by
whistleblowers.44 Among other possible violations, a revocation
of security clearance is grounds for an investigation into
whether retaliation occurred.45 There have been some
successful investigations into retaliation for whistleblowers
under this scheme.46
The CSRA created the Office of the Special Counsel (OSC),
which is in charge of investigating allegations that a whistleblower
was fired as retaliation.47 The OSC has the power to remedy and
36 Id. at 73-74.
37 Id. at 74.
38 Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978).
39 Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 1101 (1978).
40 VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 217 (2012).
41 Lindsay Boyd & Brian Futagaki, Intelligent Whistleblowing, J. OF PUB.
INQUIRY, Spring/Summer 2010, at 20, 21, available at https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/
files/files/sp10jpi.pdf.
42 Id.
43 U.S., DEP’T OF DEF., ORGANIZATION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DOD),
available at http://odam.defense.gov/Portals/43/Documents/Functions/Organizational%
20Portfolios/Organizations%20and%20Functions%20Guidebook/DoD_Organization_Ma
rch_2012.pdf.
44 Boyd & Futagaki, supra note 41, at 21-22.
45 Id. at 22.
46 Id. at 22-23 (describing three instances of retaliation that were corroborated by
the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General in the past three years).
47 Lilyanne Ohanesian, Protecting Uncle Sam’s Whistleblowers: All-Circuit
Review of WPA Appeals, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 615, 618 (2013).
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punish accordingly any claims of retaliation.48 Nevertheless,
despite this big step for whistleblower protection from retaliation
for government employees, the CSRA was largely ineffective.49
Most importantly, the law was limited in scope; in particular,
whistleblowers were not protected when it came to “information
classified in the interests of national defense or foreign
affairs.”50 There was also no “legal protection [from retaliation]
for many important disclosures by national security
whistleblowers” because the CSRA excluded “the FBI, the CIA,
the [DIA], the NSA, and other national security agencies.”51
Further, the definition of “agency” in the CSRA excludes any
agency whose function the President determines is “the
conduct of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities.”52 The practical effect of these exceptions is to carve
out a large area where no protection exists—arguably where
whistleblowing is needed most. The excluded agencies are
granted broad authority, and the abuse of such power poses a
threat to civil liberties. In practice, federal employees felt the
law was hostile toward them; there were no cases brought on
behalf of a whistleblower since the year of its passage, and
contrary to the idea of whistleblower protections, the OSC
revealed whistleblower identities after failing to investigate
and prosecute claims.53
As a result of these failures, Congress responded by
passing the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989.54 The purpose
of the Act, as stated by Congress, “is to protect employees,
especially whistleblowers, from prohibited personnel practices.”55
The CSRA originally made it “illegal to retaliate against
whistleblowers for making a disclosure that evidenced illegality or
specified misconduct.”56 Congress amended the language in the
Whistleblower Protection Act by changing “a disclosure” to “any
disclosure.”57 Previously, the Court interpreted “a disclosure” to
48 Id.
49 Id. (stating that “the CSRA’s whistleblower protections proved a
disappointment in the decade that followed [its enactment]”).
50 VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 217.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 217-18; 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C)(ii) (2014).
53 Ohanesian, supra note 47, at 618.
54 Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16;
Ohanesian, supra note 47, at 619.
55 Whistleblower Protection Act § 2(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
56 Thomas M. Devine, The Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989: Foundation
for the Modern Law of Employment Dissent, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 531, 551 (1999)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
57 5U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)-(B) (2012); Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 § 4(a)(3).
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allow for loopholes in which a whistleblower would not be
protected after they blew the whistle.58 For example, in Fiorillo v.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, the court held that the
whistleblower’s “primary motivation . . . must be the desire to
inform the public on matters of public concern, and not
personal vindictiveness”59 and that the whistleblower’s motives
were related to personal vendettas and therefore not “a
disclosure” protected by the act.60 The amendment had the
practical effect of “making protection mandatory whenever
justified by the evidence in a disclosure.”61 As a result,
disclosures, even when made for personal reasons rather than
the desire to inform the public on matters of public concern,
would qualify as “any disclosure” as long as they stated a claim
substantively. Despite these improvements, the problems
previously noted with the CSRA as it pertained to national
security whistleblowers were not addressed in Congress’s
amendments. It was not until the Intelligence Community
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1998 (ICWPA)62 that Congress
addressed the issue of protecting national security
whistleblowers. Congress’s findings were that:
(5) the risk of reprisal perceived by employees and contractors of the
Intelligence Community for reporting serious or flagrant problems to
Congress may have impaired the flow of information needed by the
intelligence committees to carry out oversight responsibilities; and
(6) to encourage such reporting, an additional procedure should be
established that provides a means for such employees and
contractors to report to Congress while safeguarding the classified
information involved in such reporting.63
Under this law, intelligence community whistleblowers can now
report to Congress but must report to the Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) first, who then makes the determination whether
it is credible enough to send to Congress.64 However, according to
Thomas Gimble, then-acting Inspector General of the
Department of Defense in 2006, the ICWPA is a complete
58 See, e.g., Fiorillo v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, 795 F.2d 1544
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (holding that the personal motives of the whistleblower disqualified
him from protection under the CSRA).
59 Id. at 1550
60 Id.
61 Devine, supra note 56, at 551.
62 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272,
112 Stat. 2413 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ272/
pdf/PLAW-105publ272.pdf.
63 Id.
64 Id. § 702(a).
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misnomer.65 He contends that the Act more properly is a device
that “protect[s] communications of classified information to the
Congress from executive branch employees engaged in
intelligence and counterintelligence activity.”66 That is because
there is no actual retaliation provision protecting a whistleblower
who follows these procedures, but it does allow someone to
communicate to Congress allegations of whistleblower retaliation.67
At the time of Mr. Gimble’s comments, only three complaints had
been made under the ICWPA.68 Thus, the same recurring problem
is faced by national security whistleblowers; that is, there is no
protection from retaliation in the statutes for employees of the
intelligence community.69
Finally, on October 10, 2012, President Obama issued
Presidential Policy Directive Nineteen (PPD-19), which
purports to prohibit retaliation against employees who serve in
the intelligence community or “who are eligible for access to
classified information” who report waste, fraud, and abuse.70
This is an attempt to fill in the shortcoming of the ICWPA; that
is, the lack of protection for a whistleblower who tries to report
to Congress.71 These protections, however, are practically
nullified by the inclusion of the following text: “This directive is
not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by
any party against the United States, its departments, agencies,
or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person.”72 This means that there is no legal cause of action for a
whistleblower who is fired, and the whistleblower has to
depend on the previously discussed protections for redress.73
65 National Security Whistleblower Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm.
on Nat’l Sec., Emerging Threats, and Int’l Relations of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform,
109th Cong. 6-7 (2006) (statement of Thomas F. Gimble, Acting Inspector General of
the U.S. Dep’t of Defense), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2006_hr/
021406gimble.pdf.
66 Id. at 7.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(C) (2012).
70 Presidential Policy Directive-19, Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to
Classified Information (Oct. 10, 2012), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/
ppd/ppd-19.pdf.
71 Daniel D’Isidoro, Protecting Whistleblowers and Secrets in the Intelligence
Community, NAT’L SEC. J. (Sept. 29, 2014), http://harvardnsj.org/2014/09/protecting-
whistleblowers-and-secrets-in-the-intelligence-community/.
72 Presidential Policy Directive-19, supra note 70.
73 National Security Whistleblowers Not Effectively Protected by New
Whitehouse Directive: Directive Lacks Due Process and Real Legal Protections, NAT’L
WHISTLEBLOWERS CTR. (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.whistleblowers.org/index.php?
option=com_content&task=view&id=1426&ItItem=229
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Critics of PPD-19 argue that (1) “[t]he authority to protect the
whistleblower is vested solely and absolutely with the [h]ead of
the Agency that retaliated against the whistleblower;” (2) “[t]he
Directive incorporates the ‘State’s Secrets’ privilege that
permits agency heads to fire whistleblowers regardless of the
Directive;” and, as previously discussed, (3) “[t]he Directive
explicitly neglects to create any real legal protection.”74
However, President Obama, regarding the Edward Snowden
NSA leaks,75 stated:
So the fact is, is that Mr. Snowden has been charged with three
felonies . . . . If the concern was that somehow this was the only way
to get this information out to the public, I signed an executive order
well before Mr. Snowden leaked this information that provided
whistleblower protection to the intelligence community—for the first
time. So there were other avenues available for somebody whose
conscience was stirred and thought that they needed to question
government actions.76
Based on these comments, it seems that PPD-19 is at least a
signal that the Obama Administration has recognized a need to
respond to intelligence community whistleblowers and to create
a workable whistleblower environment in the national security
arena. Nevertheless, the current patchwork of legislation and
executive action falls short and does not provide a clear path
for the national security whistleblower who may perceive his or
her only option as going to the press.
B. The Classification System
National security whistleblowers are often left without
any option but to go to the media.77 Compounding this problem is
the government’s use of the classification system. The
classification system is used as both a shield and a sword for the
74 Stephen Kohn, Where We Stand on President Obama’s “Policy Directive”
On National Security Whistleblowers, WHISTLEBLOWERS PROTECTION BLOG (Sept. 27,
2013), http://www.whistleblowersblog.org/2013/09/articles/whistleblowers-government-
empl/terrorism/where-we-stand-on-president-obamas-policy-directive-on-national-
security-whistleblowers/#more.
75 See infra Part III.
76 Joe Davidson, Obama’s ‘Misleading’ Comment on Whistleblower
Protections, WASH. POST (Aug. 12, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-08-
12/politics/41333716_1_edward-snowden-executive-order-policy-directive.
77 Melissa Khemani, The Protection of National Security Whistleblowers:
Imperative but Impossible 23 (Working Paper, May 30, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1412112 (describing the options left
for national security whistleblowers as a result of the legal framework within which
they report).
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government when it comes to national security whistleblowers. It
has been argued that the power of the executive branch to classify
documents “seem[s] to be invoked more as a shield to cover up
government incompetence or misconduct rather than to protect
classified information or national security interests.”78 At the
same time, the executive branch’s power to revoke security
clearances can be a sword in the sense that it is a form of
retaliation used to punish whistleblowers.79 The Supreme
Court has strengthened the power to revoke security clearances
as a result of its decision in Department of the Navy v. Egan.80
The Court held that the Merit Systems Protection Board could
not review the Department of the Navy’s reasons for revoking an
employee’s security clearance that led to an employee’s discharge.81
Accordingly, there is a “limitation placed on administrative and
judicial review of the revocation of security clearances”82 making
it easier for security clearance revocation to be used as retaliation.
The effects of having a security clearance revoked prevent an
employee from advancing or even retaining a position in the
federal government where such a clearance is required.
To summarize, the whistleblower provisions discussed
above, when they do protect a whistleblower, rely primarily on
internal reporting and monitoring. The mechanisms for
protection are all internal “external” review boards; that is, the
boards consist of executive branch employees who review the
complaints of whistleblowers who may or may not have been
unfairly removed from their post or had their security clearance
revoked.83 Additionally, when there is Congressional oversight, it
is limited because the OIG screens the information before it
reaches Congress pursuant to the ICWPA. The inspectors general
are also internal “external” review mechanisms. The President
appoints them “by and with the advice and consent of the Senate”
and has the power to remove them with notice to Congress of his
or her reasons for doing so.84 Although few question that the
inspectors general are capable of doing a fair and impartial job,
it is noteworthy that the Government considers itself more
prepared to handle internal reports from whistleblowers than a
private corporation is, even when it comes to protecting U.S.
78 Id. at 20-21.
79 VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 218-19.
80 Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
81 Id. at 525-33.
82 VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 218.
83 See Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 3(a)-(b), 92 Stat.
1101 (1978).
84 Id.
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citizens’ constitutional rights. Further, the classification
system and its possible manipulation by the government places
added burdens on a potential national security whistleblower.
C. Dodd-Frank Whistleblower Provisions
Two parts of the Dodd-Frank Act are relevant for
purposes of this note. The first part is the bounty program. The
Act reads, in pertinent part:
[T]he Commission, under regulations prescribed by the Commission
and subject to subsection (c), shall pay an award or awards to 1 or
more whistleblowers who voluntarily provided original information
to the Commission that led to the successful enforcement of the
covered judicial or administrative action, or related action . . . .85
The second part is the protection afforded the whistleblower in
the Dodd-Frank Act. The Act provides that:
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, directly
or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because of any
lawful act done by the whistleblower . . . in making disclosures that are
required or ordered under the Sarbanes—Oxley Act of 2002 . . . .86
The term “whistleblower” for purposes of the Dodd-Frank
Act is defined as “any individual who provides, or 2 or more
individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating to a
violation of the securities laws to the Commission.”87 This
distinction is important because Dodd-Frank has the effect of
“limit[ing] its protections to those who report externally” to the
government (not the press).88 The implication of defining the
whistleblower as someone who reports to the SEC is that
anyone who only reports within their company, or internally,
does not qualify for the bounties or the protections (although
they may be protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002).89
Despite this narrow definition of “whistleblower,”
another provision of Dodd-Frank purports to offer protection
for whistleblowers who “mak[e] disclosures that are required or
85 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 922(b)(1), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
86 Id. § 922(h)(1)(A).
87 Id. § 922(a)(6) (emphasis added).
88 Harvard Law Review Association, Corporate Law—Securities Regulation—
Congress Expands Incentives for Whistleblowers to Report Suspected Violations to the SEC,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1829, 1832 (2011) [hereinafter HLRA, Congress Expands Incentives].
89 Id.
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protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 . . . .”90
According to the Harvard Law Review Association, this
provision might cover whistleblowers who only report
internally because the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX Act) includes
a provision that protects whistleblowers who report
internally.91 However, despite including this provision, the
definition of “whistleblower” as someone who only reports to
the SEC restricts the bounty awards and protections for
whistleblowers in Dodd-Frank to those who report to the SEC.92
This has the practical effect of excluding whistleblowers who
only report internally from the bounty program and
protections, therefore discouraging internal reporting.
Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had the
opportunity to determine whether the Dodd-Frank Act protected
whistleblowers who only reported internally.93 In this case, the
plaintiff, Khaled Asadi, reported to his supervisors at G.E. Energy
(G.E.) that Iraqi officials believed G.E. had hired a woman
associated with a particular Iraqi official in order to “curry
favor with that official in negotiating a lucrative joint venture
agreement.”94 In interpreting the statute, the court found that the
definition of whistleblower “expressly and unambiguously
requires that an individual provide information to the SEC . . . .”95
The court further found that the SOX Act provision within Dodd-
Frank does not add another definition of whistleblower; rather, a
whistleblower still has to report to the SEC to fall within the
SOX Act provision of the Dodd-Frank Act.96 This ruling is in
contrast with other district courts faced with the same issue.97
More recently, the Southern District of New York found
that because there is an ambiguity in the statute (created by
the conflict between the definition of “whistleblower” as
someone who reports to the SEC and the anti-retaliation
provision not requiring the whistleblower to report to the SEC),
it is appropriate to consider how the SEC interprets the
90 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 922(h)(1)(A)(iii), 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
91 HLRA, Congress Expands Incentives, supra note 88, at 1832 n.31.
92 Id. (citing Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984)).
93 See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
94 Id. at 621.
95 Id. at 623.
96 Id. at 627.
97 See, e.g., Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11cv1424, 2012 WL 4444820, at
*4 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Nollner v. Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F.
Supp. 2d 986, 993-94 (M.D. Tenn. 2012).
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statute.98 The court found that the SEC interpreted the statute to
“not require a report to the SEC in order to obtain whistleblower
protection.”99 So, unless and until the Supreme Court decides to
hear this issue or the law is amended to fix the inconsistency in
the definition of “whistleblower,” the Dodd-Frank Act will
continue to highly discourage any type of internal reporting
because the Act’s anti-retaliation provisions100 will not protect
the employee if they have not also reported to the SEC, and they
will be ineligible for the bounty awards.
In sum, Dodd-Frank is effective at generating tips from
whistleblowers for the SEC101 in their pursuit of fixing what
President Obama described as, “a crisis born of a failure of
responsibility from certain corners of Wall Street to the halls of
power in Washington.”102 Specifically, the Act contributes to the
solution by providing “clear rules and basic safeguards that
prevent abuse, that check excess, that ensure that it is more
profitable to play by the rules than to game the system.”103
Since the Act was signed into law, three awards have already
been distributed,104 demonstrating that the whistleblower
provisions of Dodd-Frank are having an impact on detecting
and preventing financial abuses.
The objectives of the program are clear: vigorously
protect whistleblowers and motivate whistleblowing to the
government through monetary reward. The head of the SEC’s
whistleblower office, Sean McKessy, said, “[q]uality information is
the lifeblood of the program. If people think if they report
wrongdoing they get fired or risk other retaliation, that well will
dry up quickly.”105 Despite the recent ruling in Asadi v. G.E.
Energy (USA), L.L.C.,106 McKessy believes “companies are
generally investing more in internal compliance as a result of
[the] whistleblower program” and “[t]he vast majority of people
who come to [the SEC] about their current or former company
98 Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters (Markets) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 147-
48 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
99 Id.
100 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2010).
101 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 4-5, 11.
102 Press Release, White House, Statement by President Barack Obama Upon
Signing H.R. 4173 (July 21, 2010).
103 Id.
104 Press Release, supra note 20; see also Kelton, supra note 20.
105 Cheryl Soltis Martel, SEC Whistleblower Office Preps for Additional Tips,
NACD DIRECTORSHIP (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.directorship.com/sec-whistleblower-
office-preps-for-additional-tips/ (internal quotation marks omitted).
106 Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
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do say they tried to report internally.”107 For example, the
recent payout of $168 million dollars to an unspecified number
of whistleblowers related to the settlement of Johnson &
Johnson with the United States over “charges that J&J
marketed drugs for unapproved uses and gave kickbacks to
doctors and nursing homes.”108 A robust internal reporting
system could have been an effective remedy for Johnson and
Johnson before it ever reached the point of negotiating a $2.2
billion settlement. This example suggests that other companies
will do as McKessy suggests and invest more in their internal
reporting systems to prevent exorbitant losses.
II. THE STRUCTURALDIFFERENCES BETWEENDODD-FRANK
ANDNATIONAL SECURITYWHISTLEBLOWING
The Dodd-Frank whistleblower structure encourages
someone to go outside the company and report to the SEC (which,
although independent, is a part of the executive branch) which
then investigates the tip.109 If the tip is credible enough, the SEC
could bring an enforcement action against the company.110 These
claims have resulted in investigations, penalties, and bounty
rewards in the millions of dollars against violating corporations.111
Under Dodd-Frank, a whistleblower still receives protection from
retaliation if they report internally (under the SOX Act), but there
is less incentive to do this if in doing so the whistleblower becomes
ineligible for the bounty.112
The national security whistleblower structure is less
clear. Based on current events and the current state of the
law,113 the structure is almost exclusively internal (the
exception being congressional oversight under the ICWPA,
which is limited).114 A flowchart diagraming the line from the
107 Rachel Louise Ensign, Q&A: Sean McKessy, Chief of the SEC’s Office of the
Whistleblower, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 25, 2013), http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-
headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-336403/.
108 Gregory Wallace, $168 Million Payout to Johnson & Johnson
Whistleblowers, CNN MONEY (Nov. 4, 2013, 5:04 PM), http://money.cnn.com/
2013/11/04/news/johnson-and-johnson-whistleblower-payout/index.html?hpt=hp_t2.
109 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 5-6.
110 See, e.g., Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC
Announces Whistleblower Action (June 12, 2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2013/2013-06-announcement.htm.
111 Kelton, supra note 20; Press Release, supra note 20.
112 See, e.g., Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir. 2013).
113 See supra Part I.B-C.
114 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, 112
Stat. 2413 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-105publ272/
pdf/PLAW-105publ272.pdf. Although it is not problematic for national security
2015] FINDING A BALANCE 1207
national security whistleblower as she reports her complaint
within the confines of the law is a straight line all the way up
to the President with stops along the way in the relevant
inspector general’s office and the head of the agency where the
whistleblower works. Conversely, the line for the Dodd-Frank
whistleblower begins in the private sphere of the corporation
and, with the exception of internal reporters (which Dodd-
Frank discourages), goes outside the corporation and across to
the public sphere of the SEC and thus up to the President.
These structural differences represent the tension
discussed115 between the President’s need to protect national
security information and the need to prevent abuses within the
government by exposing fraudulent and abusive practices.116 It
might also be suggested that the government does not want to
encourage whistleblowing when it is the subject of the
whistleblower’s allegations. Therefore, with this in mind, it is
critical to try and address this tension while still allowing for
an effective whistleblower culture within the national security
community. Otherwise, we are left with major news headlines
and scandals as would-be whistleblowers, perceiving themselves
as without options (e.g., Edward Snowden), go to the press. A
scandal never looks good, but it is also possible that these leaks to
the press have caused serious, real damage. Members of Congress
say that a recent Pentagon report suggests that Snowden’s leaks
“have set back U.S. efforts against terrorism, cybercrime, human
trafficking, and weapons proliferation.”117
Corporations and the government are similar enough
that corresponding structures should and could be applied to
both effectively. Corporations and government share four
important characteristics that make them agreeable to similar
whistleblower provisions. First, shareholders of the corporation
are similar to citizens of the government.118 Both shareholders
and citizens generally have a right to vote on important matters
ranging from leadership to amendments of bylaws119 and state
whistleblowers to begin whistleblowing internally considering the sensitive nature of
protecting our national security (after all even SOX protects internal whistleblowers), the
problem is national security whistleblowers are not even protected at any preliminary,
internal stage, arguably leaving them with little to no options but to go to the press.
115 See supra Part I.A.
116 VAUGHN, supra note 27, at 212.
117 Ken Dilanian & Richard A. Serrano, Snowden Leaks Severely Hurt U.S.
Security, Two House Members Say, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2014), http://articles.latimes.com/
2014/jan/09/nation/la-na-snowden-intel-20140110.
118 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I-III; DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, §§ 141-142, 146 (2010).
119 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 109.
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and federal constitutions. Second, the CEO of the corporation is
analogous to the President of the government.120 The CEO is
responsible for the day-to-day operations of the corporation
much like the President has control over the executive branch
and its day-to-day operations. Third, the board of directors of the
corporation is very similar to Congress.121 Both have oversight
powers. Fourth, the Judiciary serves similar functions to both
the corporation and the government.122
In practice, both corporations and the government have
similar hierarchical organizational and reporting structures. As a
result, the whistleblowing employee in both organizations is faced
with the same challenges. Their direct supervisors and those
above them may be involved in the concerning conduct. The risk
of retaliation through demotion or termination is the same for
both. The consequences of the wrongful conduct directly affect the
principal stakeholders in both organizations, shareholders in the
case of corporations and citizens in the case of the government.
Both organizations should have the same objective of promoting
lawful conduct by its employees, including its leadership.
Whether the offending conduct is accounting fraud or the
violation of constitutional rights, both are worthy of prevention.
Protection from retaliation and whistleblowing incentives are
appropriate tools to motivate appropriate conduct by both
organizations. Of course, where issues of national security are
involved, the process must take into account the need for a
potentially higher level of confidentiality.
III. A NEWWHISTLEBLOWER COURT
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) is a
workable, constitutional way for the government to obtain prior
judicial approval to engage in surveillance. The purpose of the
FISC is to balance the government’s need to investigate and seek
out national security threats with the rights of individuals by
gaining judicial approval first.123 A whistleblower court would
balance these same needs, and a court like the FISC is a working
model upon which to base the whistleblower court.
120 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I-III; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141-142, 146.
121 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I-III; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141-142, 146.
122 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I-III; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141-142, 146.
123 Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary: Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (Jan. 13, 2013), http://www.fjc.gov/history/home.nsf/
page/courts_special_fisc.html.
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A. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
Congress approved the creation of the FISC pursuant to
its Article III power.124 The FISC was created pursuant to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).125 First, the Chief
Justice of the United States Supreme Court appointed “11
district court judges from at least seven of the United States
judicial circuits.”126 In the FISC, any time a judge denies an
application for an order of surveillance, that judge must write
an opinion that is filed under seal.127 FISA also creates a review
court for the FISC consisting of “three judges, one of whom
shall be publicly designated as the presiding judge, from the
United States district courts or courts of appeals” to review
denials of applications, subject to Supreme Court review.128
In order to obtain an order of surveillance, (1) the
lawyers from the Department of Justice prepare an application
for surveillance on behalf of the agency requiring the order,
which is submitted to the FISC, (2) the FISC either approves or
denies the application (since 1979 only 11 out of 33,946 have
been denied),129 and (3) the applying agency executes the
surveillance, which ultimately may or may not lead to criminal
prosecution.130 The applications by the government and their
contents are classified.131
In United States v. Cavanagh, the Ninth Circuit upheld
the constitutionality of the FISC, holding that it did not violate
Article III of the Constitution.132 First, the court dismissed the
plaintiff ’s argument that because the FISC judges are not
tenured for life with fixed salaries, it violates Article III.133 The
court then dismissed the plaintiff ’s argument that the
surveillance applications need to be “passed upon by [A]rticle
III judges” because “the judges assigned to serve on the FISA
court are federal district judges, and as such they are insulated
from political pressures by virtue of the protections they enjoy
124 STEPHENDYCUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 593 (5th ed. 2011).
125 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (2010).
126 Id. § 1803(a)(1).
127 Id.
128 Id.§ 1803(b).
129 Todd Lindeman, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, WASH. POST
(June 7, 2013 11:53 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-foreign-intelligence-
surveillance-court/2013/06/07/4700b382-cfec-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_graphic.html.
130 DYCUS ET AL., supra note 124, at 594.
131 Lindeman, supra note 129.
132 807 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1987).
133 Id. at 791.
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under [A]rticle III.”134 Moreover, “[A]rticle III courts are not
foreclosed from reviewing the decisions of the [FISC].”135 Next,
the court rejected the proposition that the temporary
assignment to the court implicates “the principles of judicial
interpretation and separation of powers that underlie [A]rticle
III.”136 The court found that the “temporary designation within
the federal judicial system has never been thought to undermine
the judicial independence that [A]rticle III was intended to
secure.”137 Finally, the court rejected the argument that Article
II of the Constitution was violated by having the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court appoint the judges to the FISC stating that
“temporary assignment of a federal district judge to another
district did not violate the President’s appointment power
under the Constitution.”138 Therefore, with these basic
provisions in place and approved by at least the Ninth Circuit,
a similarly structured national security whistleblower court
should have an appropriate and constitutional basis.
B. The Whistleblower Court
The national security whistleblower court would
structurally mirror the FISC. It would consist of 11 judges,
appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court. A review court would consist of three judges to review
dismissal of whistleblower complaints. In support of the
staffing structure of the whistleblower court, it is useful to
consider the staff and amount of complaints handled by the
SEC’s Office of the Whistleblower. The staff of the SEC’s Office
of the Whistleblower consists of nine attorneys and three
paralegals in addition to the head of the office, Mr. McKessy,
and the deputy chief of the office, Ms. Jane A. Norberg.139
During the fiscal year 2013, the Office of the Whistleblower
received 3238 tips (a 7.9% increase from fiscal year 2012).140
Considering the success of the Office of the Whistleblower in
addressing and investigating over 3000 complaints, it is very
likely the whistleblower court would be more than capable to
handle complaints of this volume.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 791-92.
137 Id. (internal citations omitted).
138 Id. (citing Lamar v. United States, 241 U.S. 103, 118 (1916)).
139 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 23, at 5.
140 Id.
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If any change would be made to the number of
whistleblower court judges, then it would likely be to increase
the whistleblower court staff because there were more Dodd-
Frank Act whistleblower tips than there were applications to
the FISC (the FISC received between 1750 and 2000 applications
for orders of surveillance in the year 2012).141 Further, there are
complaints that the FISC is a “rubber stamp” because it
overwhelmingly approves government applications for orders of
surveillance.142 Therefore, any reduction in staff might call into
question the legitimacy of the process of the whistleblower court;
that is, the process might be considered suspect if there are a
large amount of complaints and an even smaller amount of
staff than the FISC.
The process by which whistleblowers in the intelligence
community would be heard in this new court is relatively
straightforward and simple. First, a whistleblower would file a
complaint, much like a plaintiff in a civil lawsuit. The
complaint would be similar to those in the Inspector General
Act,143 detailing any “violation of law, rules, or regulations; or
mismanagement; gross waste of funds; abuse of authority; or a
substantial and specific danger to the public health and
safety.”144 The phrase “intelligence community” would be
defined the same way that the National Security Act of 1947
defined the term to include various intelligence agencies.145 This
includes the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the
CIA, the NSA, the DIA, the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, and the National Reconnaissance Office, among
others.146 Additionally, intelligence community contractors would
be covered as in PPD-19.147 PPD-19 included supposed protection
for those “who are eligible for access to classified information.”148
In 2010, “out of 854,000 people with top secret clearances,
265,000 [we]re contractors.”149
141 Lindeman, supra note 129.
142 Dina Temple-Raston, FISA Court Appears to be Rubber Stamp for
Government Requests, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 13, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/
2013/06/13/191226106/fisa-court-appears-to-be-rubberstamp-for-government-requests.
143 See 5 U.S.C. app. § 7(a) (1978), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
USCODE-2011-title5/pdf/USCODE-2011-title5-app-inspector-sec7.pdf.
144 Boyd & Futagaki, supra note 41, at 21 (citing 5 U.S.C. app. § 7 (2012)).
145 SeeMoberly, supra note 11, at 72 n.129 (citing 50 U.S.C. § 401a(4) (2012)).
146 Id. at 72-73.
147 Presidential Policy Directive-19, supra note 70.
148 Id.
149 Dana Priest & William M. Arkin, National Security Inc., WASH. POST (July
20, 2010, 12:24 AM), http://projects.washingtonpost.com/top-secret-america/articles/
national-security-inc/.
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Any employee or contractor of the intelligence community
with any complaint that is enumerated in the Inspector General
Act could submit a complaint to the court. At the same time that
the complaint is submitted to the whistleblower court, the
complaint should be submitted to the Inspector General office of
the relevant agency. This notifies the agency that there is a
complaint, and this allows them to investigate the claim. All of
the intelligence community agencies enumerated in the National
Security Act of 1947 have an Inspector General office.150 This
would obviate the need to create any new department within an
agency to address whistleblower complaints.
It may seem that by inserting a whistleblower court into
the process this note is creating a middle man; however, in the
national security context, where whistleblowing is treated
generally with “outright hostility[,]”151 at least under the Obama
Administration, it is necessary to add a layer of protection for the
whistleblower. This is achieved by inserting the independent
judiciary into the process. Such a court addresses the tension
between the executive’s compelling interest in national security
and the interest of the public in transparency. In this case, the
phrase “transparency” is a misnomer because the whistleblower
court would be under seal and thus not transparent in the
traditional sense of the word. Nevertheless, by including
another branch of the government in the process, the judiciary,
the potential for abuse and the concentration of power to
address whistleblower complaints in the executive is very much
limited. Additionally, filing under seal to the judiciary is not a
new process because sealing different stages of the judiciary
process occurs with enough frequency that there exists a guide
on how to do it.152
Just as in ordinary litigation, the relevant inspectors
general office has the opportunity to respond to the complaint,
which it would submit to the whistleblower court. It is important
to note that there would be no jury trial. Rather, it would be much
more in line with a bench trial, with the judges playing the role of
fact finder. The inspectors general’s investigation, in line with
150 See Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency,
Inspectors General Directory & Homepage Links, http://www.ignet.gov/igs/
homepage1.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2013).
151 Moberly, supra note 11, at 73.
152 See, e.g., Robert Timothy Reagan, Sealing Court Records and Proceedings: A
Pocket Guide, FED. JUDICIAL CTR. (2010), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/
pdf.nsf/lookup/Sealing_Guide.pdf/$file/Sealing_Guide.pdf (describing the different aspects of
the judiciary as they related to being put under seal including national security issues).
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their traditional role of neutral investigator,153 should present to
the whistleblower court its findings regarding the whistleblower’s
complaint. The whistleblower court, having the information
necessary to make a decision on the merits of the complaint,
would then decide whether or not there is a real issue raised by
the complaint. This differs from the usual role of the courts
deciding whether someone has a “winning” claim. But this
difference is in line with the function of whistleblowing; that is,
to seek out and prevent or fix abuses.
Next, there are two possible outcomes for the
whistleblower’s complaint. First, if the whistleblower court finds,
after consideration of the inspectors general’s investigation and
the whistleblower’s complaint, that no “violation of law, rules, or
regulations; or mismanagement; gross waste of funds; abuse of
authority; or a substantial and specific danger to the public
health and safety”154 has been made out, then the complaint
will be dismissed. Second, if the whistleblower court does find
that there is a real allegation, then the best process forward
would be a collaborative effort to redress the complaint,
including input from the whistleblower court and its staff, the
inspectors general’s office and their staff, and the original
whistleblower, either pro se or represented by counsel.155 In this
way, the whistleblower court would be able to collaboratively
make a determination as to the best remedy of the complaint
after considering the input from the inspectors general office,
the whistleblower, and the court.
As an example, if Snowden were to decide that he does
not like the extent of the NSA surveillance program and
believes that it is a complete overstepping of the executive’s
power, he can file a complaint with as much detail as possible
and submit it to the whistleblower court for consideration. This
would be in lieu of going to The Guardian news outlet and then
fleeing the United States for fear of prosecution. One possible
153 Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 112-239, § 2, 92 Stat. 1101,
available at http://www.ignet.gov/pande/leg/igactasof1010.pdf (describing the purpose
as “to create independent and objective units”).
154 Boyd & Futagaki, supra note 41, at 21 (citing 5 U.S.C. App. § 7 (2012)).
155 This process is being used by the newly created New York State Human
Trafficking Courts. Recognizing that many people arrested for prostitution are likely
victims of human trafficking who need help rather than to be punished, the new court is a
“collaborative effort[ ] of the court system’s criminal justice partners, service providers
across the state and other stakeholders . . . where [the victim] will be evaluated by the
judge, defense attorney and prosecutor.” Press Release, New York State Unified Court
System, NY Judiciary Launches Nation’s First Statewide Human Trafficking
Intervention Initiative (Sept. 25, 2013), available at http://www.nycourts.gov/
press/PR13_11.pdf. In this way, the best result regarding the issue at stake is reached.
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complication in Snowden’s case is the fact that he is employed
by Booz Allen rather than the NSA. The whistleblower court,
however, in addition to hearing complaints from government
employees, would also hear complaints from people who work
for government contractors.
Next, the whistleblower court would read through the
complaint and send it to the NSA Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) so that it can begin its investigation. In due
time, the OIG completes its investigation of the surveillance
being conducted and gives the whistleblower court its analysis
of the issues raised in the complaint. Much like the debate
going on today, the whistleblower court would consider
whether what Snowden revealed is a violation of the law.
Although it may seem that the whistleblower court would have
to undertake the strenuous task of deciding if the NSA’s
conduct is illegal, the complaints can also be considered under
the Inspector General Act’s standard, which includes
complaints relating to “a substantial and specific danger to the
public health and safety.”156 This broadens the whistleblower
court’s analysis by considering, along with the inspectors
general and the whistleblower, the potential harm that the
practices would have on the public’s health and safety.
The legal issue regarding the surveillance has been
considered by the FISC in the past at least once, and there
have also been two district court opinions relating to the NSA’s
surveillance program. The FISC opinion that was declassified
with redactions, written by Judge John Bates, revealed that
the FISC did find the NSA surveillance program improper.157
After the government made improvements to their applications
by fixing the problems noted by Judge Bates, the FISC approved
the program once again.158 But there is now a split in the district
courts about the constitutionality of the NSA surveillance
program. First, in Klayman v. Obama,159 the District Court for the
District of Columbia ruled that the surveillance “almost certainly”
156 5 U.S.C. app. § 7(a) (2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
USCODE-2011-title5/pdf/USCODE-2011-title5-app-inspector-sec7.pdf.
157 See Judge Bates’s Opinion on N.S.A. Program, United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court 32 available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/
doj/fisa/fisc0912.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2015) (finding that the minimization procedures
used by the government in the collection of data were inadequate to protect citizens);
Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Secret Court Rebuked N.S.A. on Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/22/us/2011-ruling-found-an-nsa-program-
unconstitutional.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0.
158 Savage & Shane, supra note 157.
159 Klayman v. Obama, No. 13-0881 (RJL), 2013WL 6598728 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 2013).
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violated a reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth
Amendment.160 Closely following the Klayman decision, the
Southern District of New York ruled that the NSA surveillance
was not only constitutional but that it was also “the
Government’s counter-punch: connecting fragmented and
fleeting communications to re-construct and eliminate al-
Qaeda’s terror network.”161 Given the different opinions reached
in the two courts, it is possible that the Supreme Court could
end up hearing the case.162 The constitutionality of the
surveillance program is beyond the scope of this note, but the
fact that the FISC and two district courts are in disagreement
with the government and each other over whether the
surveillance is proper, it almost certainly could be argued it
poses a substantial danger to public health and safety.
In addition to the legal analysis, the whistleblower court
could make recommendations to the NSA and the executive
branch or even permit legal action to be taken against the NSA,
much like the SEC can bring actions against corporations that
are violating laws or regulations. The whistleblower court could
also issue opinions similar to the Judge Bates opinion, discussed
above, finding that the NSA surveillance was improper, if the
whistleblower’s complaint warranted such a finding.163
C. Merits and Drawbacks of a Possible Whistleblower
Complaint Court
The whistleblower court would enable someone like
Snowden to proceed through channels that adequately balance
the national security issues with the transparency, checks, and
balances required to run an efficient government. Some of the
drawbacks are exemplified by the Snowden example as well.
The main problem is what the whistleblower court does with the
information it hears. Does it have the authority to intervene and
order the government to do anything? Considering that the FISC
has the authority to deny or approve surveillance applications, it
is likely that the whistleblower court would be able to issue
orders to the offending government agency. The answer to this
question may in fact improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of
160 Id. at *19.
161 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 757 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
162 Orin Kerr, Will the Supreme Court Review the NSA’s Telephony Metadata
Program?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 2, 2008, 8:47 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2014/
01/02/supreme-court-take-bulk-telephony-case-circuit-courts-dont-invalidate-program/.
163 See Judge Bates’s Opinion on N.S.A. Program, supra note 157, at 31.
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the whistleblower court. If Congress creates the whistleblower
court as it did the FISC, then it can find the appropriate balance
between the whistleblower court’s new power and the executive’s
existing power. This adds to the legitimacy of the court and of
the whistleblowing process as a whole because now all three
branches of the government are represented and active in the
process. With the three branches having input, the proper
amount of checks and balances will be effective to ensure that
the new whistleblower court does not exert too much control
over the executive and that the executive is not dangerously
untethered in its clearly legitimate goal and responsibility of
providing for the national security of the United States.
There could also be the issue of whether the national
security whistleblower needs to exhaust internal reporting
mechanisms available to her. If it appears that requiring
exhaustion of remedies is too onerous for the national security
whistleblower, this suggests that requiring exhaustion before
filing a complaint is not a good idea. In fact, requiring
exhaustion would give the current government whistleblower
apparatus control over whether the complaint ever makes it to
the whistleblower court. For example, in the ICWPA, the
complaint only went to Congress if the Office of the Inspector
General deemed it credible. Therefore, requiring exhaustion
would likely have the same effect and is thus not advisable.
There are still other considerations that would need to
go into the formation of the whistleblower court. For instance,
what kind of standard would be used to decide whether a
complaint should be dismissed? These types of questions would
best be answered in practice. The whistleblower court would
create its own jurisprudence and precedent as issues arise.
One thing is certain: the whistleblower court (rather
than a leak to the media) is a much more appropriate and
efficient way to expose government wrongdoings. Attorney
General Eric Holder said that “‘the mechanisms that [Snowden]
used’ to publicize his concerns with the government’s surveillance
aren’t ‘worthy of clemency.’”164 Nonetheless, he admitted that
“Snowden sparked a necessary conversation.”165 This conversation
has resulted in President Obama “announc[ing] the end of the
telephone metadata program, the way it exists now, after the
164 Evan Perez & Leigh Ann Caldwell, CNN Exclusive: Holder Fears ‘Lone Wolf ’
Terrorist Attack, Doesn’t Want TSA Armed, CNN (Nov. 6, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/11/05/politics/holder-terror-snowden-interview/index.html?hpt=hp_t2.
165 Id.
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disclosure of the practice by the former National Security Agency
contractor Edward J. Snowden.”166 The obvious question then, is
how would this conversation have been started if Snowden did
not do what he did? This is the role that the whistleblower
court would play. It would, at least when the public health and
safety is concerned, start the conversation. It is true that the
whistleblower court would be under seal but, at a certain point,
the findings, much like the announcements of the SEC’s
actions after investigating whistleblower tips, would be made
public to the extent the information did not endanger national
security. At worst, if the whistleblower court found itself in a
gray area such as the legality of the NSA’s surveillance
program, then it could have begun the conversation by
notifying Congress through the appropriate channels.
Importantly, the whistleblower court begins to look more
like the Dodd-Frank Act provisions that the executive branch has
fully embraced and encouraged. Reverting back to the flowchart,167
the national security whistleblower’s complaint no longer goes
straight up to the President. Rather, it now looks much more like
the Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower’s line, which begins in the
private sphere and goes outside the corporation, across to the
SEC, and thus up to the President. The national security
whistleblower’s complaint now goes outside the internal
structure of the executive branch of the government and into
the judiciary that was legislated by Congress. From there, the
judges and other parties concerned have a much better chance
at resolving any issues that may exist.
CONCLUSION
A whistleblower court would push the executive branch
toward the middle of a spectrum that has at one end the Dodd-
Frank Act whistleblowing apparatus, which highly encourages
the practice, and at the opposite end, the Obama Administration
prosecuting whistleblowers under the 1917 Espionage Act.
Although not enjoying the robust protections and the monetary
rewards that corporate whistleblowers have under the Dodd-
Frank Act, national security whistleblowers will no longer need
to disclose confidential information to the public because of the
ability to report government fraud or abuse to the whistleblower
166 Mark Landler & Charlie Savage, Obama Outlines Calibrated Curbs on
Phone Spying, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/18/
us/politics/obama-nsa.html?_r=0.
167 See supra Part II.
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court. The debate in this country over Snowden’s disclosure
definitely suggests that the NSA surveillance program is a hotly
contested issue. Rather than suffer the problems caused by
uncontrolled public disclosures that the Obama Administration
now faces, encouraging whistleblowing and having an effective
mechanism in place to foster an appropriate environment for
whistleblowing are steps toward preventing and addressing
frauds and other violations of law while at the same time
protecting the government’s legitimate need for secrecy when it
comes to our national security. The whistleblower court is an
effective mechanism and strikes this balance by providing a
legitimate means for national security whistleblowers to safely
transmit their concerns to the judiciary thereby preventing the
leaks of classified information to the press.
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